How Far for Social Justice?

Courses: Ethics – War and Pacifism in the Christian Tradition

How Far Should a Christian Go in Search of Social Justice?

by Larry Bishop and Diana Pavlac
Cornerstone Magazine, Vol. 11 Issue 61, pp 28-32. {Reprinted by Permission}

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POLAND – As we look back over 25 months of intense drama, we see a struggle that reflects the desires of millions for freedom and a voice in their own destiny. But most of all, this embodies a call to accountability and, by effect, a demand for a government by consent of the governed.

In the midst of the situation, the Roman Catholic church took what some would consider a truly radical position, offering support and advice to the striking worker.. It has affirmed what it feels is its duty to proclaim man’s fundamental right ” . . . to form free associations”[i] in society, a concept foreign to communism. The church has gone so far as to enter into negotiations with both government and Solidarity leaders, as did Polish primate and archbishop Josef Glemp in a meeting on November 4 of last year.

Some feel the church has taken a major role in the cause of Solidarity and is largely responsible for the creation of the psychological climate from which it was to emerge.

Christians are becoming increasingly involved in the advocation of revolutionary change. Their concern is based on a sense of biblical justice. Of such concern, Christian ethicist Paul Ramsey writes: “No authority on earth can withdraw from them [the church] their intrinsic and justifiable tendencies to rescue from dereliction, and oppression all whom it is possible to rescue.”[ii]

Paradoxically, mainstream Christianity has long paid particular attention to reverence for established authority. And from the first centuries of the church, the maintenance of order has been seen as ordained by God and entrusted to the government.

What is the correct role of the Christian in times of revolution? While Poland is certainly a contemporary crisis, it is also an echo of numerous historical incidents. In anlayzing the contemporary roles of both the whole Christian church and each of its members, it is useful to look at historical precedents, and the philosophical perspective of godly men who have grappled with this issue.

Believers in the early centuries of the church saw the Roman state as a force of uniquely awesome size and power and, because of its world domination, recognized its potential for establishing worldwide peace. In fact, for most of these early Christians, peace was only conceivable within the civilizing framework of the state. The state existed as the servant of Cod, ordained to mainain order, and equipped with the power to uphold such good.[iii] This good was embodied not so much in the use of force or In the one who wields he force, but in the establishment of law.

Clement of Rome (end of 1st Century, A.D.), in accord with Paul’s exhoration in I Tim. 2:1-2 to, “make supplicatlons, prayers, intercesslons .. . for all who are in high positions,” began his prayer for the governing authorities saying “Give all who live in the earth harmony and peace,” whereupon he began to intercede for the Roman state.[iv]

On the other hand,Justin (? – 165 A.D.), a staunch defender of authority’s right to the use of force to uphold the law, recognized a danger in unquestioned obedience to this authority. He pointed out that just as there were good laws, there were other laws which were evil, being inspired by the devil and adopted by those of like intent.[v]

Similar ideas were held by Tertullian (155 – 220 ? A.D.), who maintained that law was not self-sanctioning, but justified only when It forbade evil and gave way to good. He noticed various old laws which had fallen to the wayside either because they had proved inapplicable in actual practice or because the Romans had shirked their obligations as its administrators.

Tertullian reasoned that since the law did not fall from heaven but was the work of fallible men, it was liable to error and therefore must be examined and evaluated against the standard of God’s unchanging law. Human law, which did not stand such scrutiny, no longer commanded obedience.[vi]

This idea was predominant with many of the early church fathers, including Orgen, Basil of Caesarea, Theophilus of Antioch, Irenaeus, and Hippolytus of Rome. Each of these writers agreed that the primary criterion for law and legal authority was the good of all men, as specified by God. In addition, both law and authority existed according to a hierarchy. In the case of conflicting commands, the superior was to be obeyed. The laws and authorities of the state were to be given absolute obedience provided that they did not command that which God forbade, or omit that which he enjoined.[vii]

Of such hierarchical order Augustine (354- 430 A.D.) wrote: “Consider these several grades of human powers. If the magistrate enjoin anything, must it not be done? Yet if his order be in opposition to the proconsul, thou dost not merely despise the power, but choosest to obey a greater power. Again, if the proconsul himself enjoin anything, and the emperor another thing, is there any doubt, that disregarding the former we ought to obey the latter? So then, if emperor enjoin one thing, and God another, what judge ye? Pay me tribute, sumit thyself. . right, but not in an idol’s temple. In an idol’s temple He bids it. Who forbids it? A greater power. Pardon me then: thou threateneth a prison, He threateneth hell.”[viii]

Continuing in this same vein, Hippolytus of Rome (? -236 A.D.) wrote in his Commentary on Daniel: “We must follow the role which the Lord Himself prescribed: ‘Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s.’ If therefore anyone thinks that because he is a Christian, he is not obligated to pay taxes or imports or does not have to render the honor due to those powers which deal with these matters, he is seriously mistaken. Likewise, if anyone thinks that he must be subject in such a manner that the man who excels with a certain majesty in the administration of temporal affairs is thought to have power even over his faith, he falls into an even greater error.”[ix]

In this context, passive disobedience was the only form of disobedience the early church would countenance. This attitude was founded on the basis of a doctrine known as patientia, developed primarily by such writers as Tertullian, Lactinantius and Origen.

In its basic form, patientia maintained that the use of force or violence to defend even the highest values was radically in opposition to the very foundations of Christianity. This did not mean Christians should give up the idea of influencing history but rather it was to be affirmed that there was a power other than the use of force.

Such an affirmation rested on the Christian’s active belief in God as the source of that power and the hope of its fulfillment in his eternal kingdom. On this order, the believers gave God room to act, placing their trust in Him and enduring any present evil with the certatnty of final victory over it.[x]

Clearly the early Christians saw violent resistance and retaliation as contradictory to the nature and purpose of Christ and able to achieve only the exact opposite of any well meaning intention. Tertullian asserted that believers could resist injustice without resorting to unjust means, that they must not return evil for evil.

So we see that the early church viewed the state as being ordained of God in order to provide a civilizing framework to maintain the peace and order of society. They held a strict obedieiice to the law, honoring its representative authorities. But such subjection was given on a hierarchical basis, granting the temporal powers obedience and respect, but reserving absolute authority to God and God’s law. This represented the recognition that the present order was limited and potentially fallible, either due to satanic influence or man’s fallible nature.

Thus civil disobedience was not seen as a negative reaction against the government, but a positive response to the higher ethic of God. When resistance was chosen, it was understood to included acceptance of the consequences. In addition, violent resistance wan seen as ineffective compared to restraint, contrary to basic Christian principles, and unnecessary in light of a powerful and active God and His eternal kingdom.


Through the Middle Ages, Christians by and large held to these principles, yet the focus shifted from a recognition of the fallibility of the law to fallibility of the law’s administrators. Authority exeicised its power as a divine trust, and the monarch who betrayed that trust was seen to have lost the right to claimobedience from his subjects.

Illustrating this shift, the bishop of Charles, John of Salisbury (1115 – 1180). reasoned that when a monarch violated his responsibilities, his subjects ought to be used of God to resist him and, if necessary, rightly depose and execute him.[xi]

Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) opposed tyrannicide, but favored active resistance to despotic rulers, while maintaining the ordered and peaceful role of society. Consequently, Aquinas discreetly advised that “action against a tyrant should not be taken by the private assumption of individuals but rather by public authority.”[xii] By the term “public authority” Aquinas denignated the consensus of the community.

Marsilius of Padua (1275 – 1348), theologian, rector of University of Paris, came to many similar conclusions but he began from a different assumption, as did several of his contemporaries. Though a theologisin, he did not define law and government on the basis of moral and theological criteria, but rather according to a strict political definition. He saw leadership primarily as a servant of the people rather than a servant of God.

Marsilius held that because the ruler is elected by the people, if he violates the law, he can he corrected, deposed, and punished by the people. The authority to judge the ruler may be exercised by delegated persons, but such authority ultimately belongs to the people as its legislators.

Three factors were suggested by Marsilius regarding the correction of a ruler:

First, any grave excess must be punished, lest the outrage of the people threaten the stability of the state.

Second, if possible, such an excess should be dealt with on the basis of existing law, but if the law does not determine the penalty, the people as its legislators must determine the punishment.

Third, slight excesses on the part of a ruler should be overlooked to preserve the stability of the state and the respect of the ruler. However if such excesses become overly frequent, they should be dealt with as determined by law.

While these suggestions served to provide a reasonable context for the positive correction of tyranny, theyfailed on a practical level not taking into account the extent to which tyranny often goes.[xiii]

The key contribution of this time was a view of the law as an embodiment of justice, and therefore superior to the king. The king in turn was seen as a delegate of popular will and a responsible steward of the people’s best interests. This reflected a significant expansion of Lex Regia, a Roman concept by which the people ceremoniously conferred power on their emperor. This concept had been lost in the turmoil of medieval rule. It was this perception of accountability during the 12th, 13th and 14th centuries that began to shift support away from the absolutist view of monarchy and served largely in the development of doctrines of legitimate resistance.



By the beginning of the reformation in the 16th century, the contractual view was gaining greater acceptance. though not without distinct opposition. One of the earliest reformational writers, William Tyndale (1492-1586) held a conservative view of obedience much like that of the early fathers. He sanctioned disobedience only in the case of commands contrary to divine law, advocating suffering the consequences and tarrying until God rendered judgment. He forbade active resistance, rebellion, and tyrannicide. It was inconceivable that disobedience or rebellion could establish a better social and political order. Anarchy was considered the worst of all possible earthly evils.[xiv]

Along these lines, both Martin Luther (1488-1546) and John Calvin (1509-1564) equivocated on the right to resistance and revolution.

Luther completely opposed such actions on the part of Christians, claiming that “revolution is always avenged. Even when it succeeds, it has to pay dearly. This in itself shows that revolution is not in accordance with God’s will.”[xv]

Luther nevertheless grants that in some situations Christians may disobey their government. On this order he sets forth a specific question for consideration: “What if a prince is in the wrong? Are his people bound to follow him then too?” To this he replies: “If you know for sure that he is wrong, then you should fear God rather than men (Acts 5:29), and you should neither fight nor serve, for you cannot have a good conscience before God.”[xvi]

From this standpoint passive disobedience is not simply allowed but is mandatory, lest by obedience the law of God is compromised. But to resort to force against duly constituted authority is forbidden. The Christian’s proper weapon is prayer.

In addition, Luther used his pen as a sword, speaking out sharply against tyrannous acts on the part of princes, warning them of dire consequences. In 1523 Luther issued his short work:

“Concerning the Secular Magistracy and how far one is under obligation to obey it” warning: “Your tyranny and arbitrary proceedings cannot and will not be long endured… God will no longer have it so. The time is past when you may hurt and harrass the people like wild beasts.”[xvii]

That Luther was this revolutionary may seem unlikely to some, yet it should be realized that such writings are for Luther simply a warning of what he viewed as the inevitable consequence of tyrannous acts, not a legitimation for revolution. History illustrates some inherent contradictions here since Luther sided with those who condemned rebellion, rather than those who caused it.

Illustrative of such action is Luther’s response to the Swabian peasant revolt of 1525. While Luther supported the grievances outlined in the twelve articles of the peasants, when they began to revolt, he counseled the nobility and princes to strangle them “as you would mad dogs.” For, “the only way to make Herr Omnes (“Mr. Trouble”) do what he ought to is to constrain him by law and the sword… as one holds wild beasts by chains and cages.”[xviii] Despite such language, Luther is usually excused in this instance, his actions being explained as acquiescence to political expediency.

While Calvin is of an equally conservative temperament, instilling a strict oloedience to legitimate authority and sanctioning passive disobedience as the sole recourse in the face of wrong, he nevertheless makes allowance for a significant difference. In the fourth volume of Institutes he argues magistrates are agents of God and must administer the judgments of God even by use of the sword. However, Calvin, like Aquinas, preferred that such magistrates exercise this function within the existing framework of law and government agencies.

In addition, he cautioned it was not the right of subjects to overthrow a tryannous ruler, but admitted God sometimes raised up “avengers from among his servants,” granting them “his command to punish… wicked government and deliver his people.”[xix]

Although his writings acknowledged the use of force, even violence, in practice was more conservative and when faced with specific issues counseled non-resistance.

Typifying such counsel, Calvin in 1559 while initially offering countenance, later withdrew his support of the Amboise conspiracy (a plot to overthrow the unscrupulous control of the house of Guise over the monarchy of France). He reasoned that in a revolt led by nobles, the extent of the resulting bloodshed would scandalize the cause of Christ. The conspiracy failed and in 1561 Calvin subsequently issued his disclaimers of the affair.

Yet some scholars challenge Calvin’s credibility in regards to this affair, stating that : “He was by no means unsupportive, despite his retrospective repudiations…”[xx] and “although Calvin constantly preached patience and obedience, it is also clear from his own correspondence that he did envisage the use of force if necessary to install (Antoine De Bourbon, king of) Navarre in power at the end of 1560.”[xxi]

But in the same year which Calvin wrote his disclaimers, he also published a lecture on Daniel 6:22 in which he sanctioned defiance on the part of the common people toward princes who opposed God, stating: “Earthly princes lay aside all their uk power when they rise up against God… we ought rather utterly to defy them than to obey them when they are so restive as to despoil God of his right.”[xxii]

But again, of this lecture Professor of History Richard Greaves writes: “Since this position was taken by Calvin in the aftermath of the successful Scottish revolution, there is a possibility that he was influenced by Knox.”[xxiii] Another scholar has remarked concerning Calvin’s apparently contradictory behavior: “His political philosophy allowed for successful rebellions; their success made them legitimate.”[xxiv] It is impossible to determine whether Greaves is correct that Calvin determined the propriety of violence on the hasis of its relative success. However, it is clear that Calvin continued to grapple with the questions of rebellion and force throughout his life, finding a consistent conclusion difficult to achieve in his writiugs, and even more difficult to apply.

John Knox (1505 – 1572) represents a truly radical departure from the views of both Calvin and Luther. He agreed civil government was ordained of God and deserved obeience as long as they did not command things contrary to divine precepts. But, while Luther would in no way sanction rebellion, and Calvin reserved that right for the civil magistrates only, Knox concluded that the common man had both the right and the duty to disobedience and rebellion if the rule of the magistrates became unscriptural.

Knox’s views never vacillated but underwent a progressing development. Reginning in 1552, Knox advised his Berwick congregation to obey civil authorities, no matter how wicked, unless their orders clearly contravened God’s law. In the ensuing years he further formulated his doctrIne of resistance and by 1558 he was calling for the overthrow of idolatrous rulers. He saw civil authority as subiect to biblical authority, and the deposition of tyranny was not just a legitimate option, but rather a Christian’s responsibility.

The covenant concept which underscored his conclusions was outlined in his 1555 “Appellation,” a treatise addressed to the nobility and commonwealth of Scotland. Knox cites asone example of the covenant made by Josiah on behalf of the Hebrew people that they should observe God’s law in 2 Kings 23.

“And the king stood by the pillar and made a covenant before the Lord, to walk after the Lord and to keep his commanduients and his testimonies and his statutes, with all his heart and all his soul, and to perform the words of this covenant… and all the people joined in the covenant” (2 Kings 23:3). This provided Knox with the idea of a pact between temporal authority and God, and also implied the participation of the people. Princes who exceeded the bounds of the covenant were to be disobeyed, because of the subjects’ higher duty to God as based on the ovenant.[xxv]

Knox also called attention to tlie covenant maile by Asa with the Hebrews to serve God in 2 Chronicles 15. “And he gathered all Judah and Benjamin, and those from Ephraim, Manasseh, and Simeon who were sojourning with them… And they entered into a covenant to seek the Lord” (2 Chron. 15:9, 12).

This idea of covenant served to provide a mutual contract of obligation between rulers and their people. The latter could disobey if the ruler did not fulfill his obligation to uphold the law or if he exceeded his authority. Likewise, subjects were bound to obey the laws and civil authorities and were liable to punishment for their disobedience. Yet while ruler and subject have a mutual obligation toward one another on the basis of covenant, upolding God’s law is of primary importance for both. Obligations between ruler and subject become secondary.

Of this concept Richard Greaves writes: “The… doctrine of obedience to higher powers, when qualified by a statement limiting obedience to matters not contravening divine precepts, made the road to rebellion psychologically inevitable… where either a majority of the people or a disciplined strong minority were convinced of their right to disobey an ungodly monarch, it was only a matter of time before they would refuse to accept either the punishment for their disobedience or flight into exile.”[xxvi]

Lest we view John Knox as a mad man who invited thoughtless rebellion, it should be noted that throughout his career he appealed for both moderation and compromise whenever truly fundamental ideals were not at stake .

For Knox, open armed rebellion was justifiable only as a last resort, on the failure of two preconditions which Knox set. First, all other expedients, beginning with prayer, patience and submission must be exhausted.

Second, armed reistance should be led by legitimately constituted lesser authorities, authorities, whose duty it was to under covenant to uphold the law and therefore depose rulers who later broke covenant and abrogated their authority. Open rebellion- by commoners was only justifiable when these preconditions failed.[xxvii]

By and large, reformational concepts of government and law hearken back to the writings of the early church fathers, particularly Augustine. Government exists as a civilizing framework serving to uphold justice, using force if necessary to punish evildoers and safeguarding the good of society. Reformational thinkers gave equal attention to both functions, but as we have seen, their thinking tended to develop divergently. Thinkers like Luther viewed the state as chiefly founded on power in order to keep man’s sinful nature in check. Others, like Knox, tended to subordinate power to law and so achieved a concept of the state which is founded on justice.

Samuel Rutherford (1600 – 1661) published his Lex Rex (the Law and the Prince), in 1644, challeaging Bishop John Maxwell’s Sacrosancta Regum Majestas (divine right of kings). Maxwell’s doctrine purported that the king ruled in the capacity of a regent by God’s appointment. On this order, the king’s word became the law. In opposition Rutherford argued from Romans 13 that civil law is instituted by God but still remains subject to God’s law.

Like Knox, Rutherford argued the lawfulness of resistance on the basis of the covenant, stating that while God had indeed granted power to the civil authorities, the original trust and receptacle, “of all power is the community…”[xxviii] For Rutherford, resistance actually is a removal of a magistrate’s authority, returning it to the people due to violations of the conditions under which it was originally given by God.

Concerning illegitimate acts of state, Rutherford offered a variety of suggestions, all of which appeal to moderation. As a ground rule, he wrote that monarchs should not be deposed on the basis of a minor breach of the people’s trust, but only on the condition of such offenses which strike at the fundamental structure of society. In the case of such events, Rutherford does not propose armed violence as the immediate solution. Rather, he instructs that there are three levels of appropriate resistance, each existing as a precondition on the following level of order.

First, protest (most often by a registered legal action).

Second, flight (oftentimes this may not be possible, due to prohibitive factors relating to both transportation, economics, etc.).

Third, force (only on the failure of the two preceeding preconditions, and in self-defense). However, Rutherford offered that force was more properly used by lesser magistrates who constituted a legal authority; indeed, that it is their duty as such authority.[xxix]

One last historical note is appropriate at this point, for while there are distinctly strong similarities between John Knox and Samuel Rutherford, the final expression of their ideas is most often attributed to enlightenment thinker John Locke (1632 – 1704). In his “Second Treatise On Civil Government,” Locke makes note of how God helped Hezekiah in his rebellion against Assyria in 2 Kings 15, stating: “Whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which force, and not right hath set over anyone, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet it is no offense before God, but is that which he allows and countenances…”[xxx]


Now to a more pointed question: What should our role in revolution be? History presents us with a variety of approaches and rationales, but does not, and cannot, make this decision for us.

Obviously Christians today, as in the past, are making diverse judgments about such issues as obedience, resistance, violence and justice. However, among those many possible convictions, two stand out prominently enough to demonstrate the issues.

Some Christians believe that biblical commitment means the rejection of violence, particularly in its most damaging forms, war and revolution. They point to the suffering and the resurrection of Christ as the basis of their hope, and find their ideal in the writings of the early church fathers. They believe that Christians are called to live by the ethic of the New Testament established in Christ.

Other Christians, sensitive to the hidden sins of violence which permeate many human institutions, see themselves surrounded and sometimes find it necessary to respond to violence with force. They observe that even the most peaceable Christians in a stable society partake in the benefits of its legal institutions for the protection of their lives and goods, institutions whose sanction is guaranteed by the coercive power of the state. This issue for them is not detachment from force but its responsible exercise in the promotion of justice.

One is hard pressed to choose between these positions, yet perhaps it is less important to choose than it is to realize that both sides have the possibility of equal fraudulence or authenticity. The love of peace can be fraudulent when it becomes the love of comfort and privilege and gives place to complacency. On this order, Jeremiah criticized the priests who cried peace when there was no peace. “For from the least to the greatest of them, every one is greedy for unjust gain; and from prophet to priest every one deals falsely. They have healed the wounds of my people lightly saying ‘Peace, when there is no peace.’” (Jeremiah 6:13, 14)

Equally, the exercise of force be ethically fraudulent. For centuries, wars

wars of aggression have been waged on the pretext of defense and justice in order to mask the nnterests gained through exploitation of the weak and poor.

Yet neither the cause of peace nor conflict need be ~fraudulent. When men like Martin Luther King or John Perkins advocated non-violent social change, they were not acting in self-interest or out of fear of the loss of freedom through imprisonment or death. Rather they walked in the Christian, admonition that they who take the sword shall perish by the sword.

Likewise, those who risk and give their lives in conflict are not always seeking personal gain. They may sacrifice their security to defend the security of others against aggressors or in order to strike a blow against tyranny. On this order, it is well within the scope of scripture to believe that God, who casts down the mighty and exalts the lowly, does so at times by human understanding through human agents.

Lest we place too much credence ill either argument, it should be realized that these discussions will no doubt continue on both sides of the fence until the Lord returns. Yet each of us must continue to seek a more thorough understanding of the issues. For example, something Is clearly wrong when Christians who routinely enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as “inalienable rights” condemn those who seek to secure the same by means of active resistance, while these same Christians enjoy such freedoms through guarantee of massive armament.

This should not be construed as arguing that every revolution, any more than any war, is justifiable. For this reason, it would be helpful to try and develop some form of moral criteria for the “just revolution,” even as was done for the “just war” ages ago. This is no guarantee of success, however, as the “just war” formulations prove. For as professor of ethics Roger L. Shinn observes:

“In the classic doctrine of the just war, things were never so clear as they seemed in abstract doctrine. Decisions in conflict – above all in combat – are made under pressure, in turmoil. In life, as in biblical history, the ethical decision is usually concrete. The abstractions of scholars are often removed from reality.”‘[xxxi] Yet, if we are to say “yes” to some struggles and “no” to others there must be some basis for judgments.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in making his hard decision to take part in the plot to assassinate Hitler, felt obligated to find reasons for an act, in this case assassination, that he would not normally endorse. He did not formulate a doctrine of “just assassination,” but rather regarded his action as a last resort. Calling it all “irrational act” he thrw himself on the mercy of God.

Writing of Bonhoeffer’s action, his well-known friend and confidant, Eberhard Bethge states: “…Bonhoeffer did not think of his action as the best possible but only as a very belated answer to what had been left undone at an earlier stage… Bonhoeffer wished to bear responsibility for himself and his time, leaving the justification to God.”[xxxii]

Yet as dramatic a challenge as Bethge’s analysis presents, the ultimate challenge is capture best in Bonhoeffer’s own words.

“In the course of historical life there comes a point where the exact observance of the formal law of a state… suddenly finds itself in violent conflict with the ineluctable necessities of the lives of men: at this point responsible and pertinent action leave behind it the domain of principle and convention, the domain of the normal and the regular, and is confronted by the extraordinary situation of ultimate necessities. A situation which no law can control… the necessities… cannot…be governed by any law or themselves constitute a law…

“The extraordinary necessity appeals to the freedom of the men who are responsible. There is no law behind which the responsible man can seek cover. In this situation there can only be a complete, renunciation of every law, together with the knowledge that here one must make one’s decision as a free venture, together also with the open admission that here the law is being infringed and violated… precisely ill this breaking of the law the validity of the law is acknowledged…

“If any man tried to escape guilt in responsibility he detached himself from the ultimate reality of human existence, and what is more he’ cuts himself off from the redeeming mystery of Christ bearing guilt without sin and he has no share in the divine justification which lies upon this event. He sets his own personal innocence above his responsibility for men, and he is blind to the more irredeemable guilt which he incurs precisely in this.“[xxxiii]

It is not that the decision does not matter, rather it matters so much that there is no way we can escape the responsibility and consequences of making the decision.


[i]Thomas A Sancton. “He Dared to Hope” Time Jan 4, 1982, pg. 17

[ii] Paul Ramsey. The Just War. New York, 1968, p. 36.

[iii] G. Zampaglione, The Idea of Peace in Antiquity, London, 1973. pp. 182-183.

[iv] Clement of Rome, Letter 60.4

[v] Justin, First Apology, 12,1, 16. 14

[vi] Tertullian, Apology.

[vii] Jean Michel Horn s. It is Not Lawful for Me to Fight. Scottsdale, PA, p. 68.

[viii] Augustine Sermon 62.8

[ix] Hippolytus of Rome, Commentary on Daniel 4.9

[x] Herbert Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine, N.Y. 1963. pp. 798-82.

[xi] Edward Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, London, 1954. pp. 142-146

[xii] A.J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West. New York, 1950 Vol. 4, pg. 136.

[xiii] Richard L. Greaves. Theology and Revolution in the Scottish Reformation. Grand Rapids, MI 1980. pp 146-7

[xiv] William Tyndale, Doctrinal Treatises, Ed. Martin Clebsch. London. pp. 174-77.

[xv] Helmut Thielicke. Theological Ethics. Philadelphia, 1969 Vol.2 pp. 341

[xvi] Ibid., pg. 521

[xvii]J.M Porter, Luther, Selected Political Writings. Philadelphia, 1974. pg. 133

[xviii]William Morris. The Christian Origins of Social Revolt. London 1949. pp 74-75

[xix] John Calvin, Calvin’s Institutes, Grand Rapids, MI, pg. 801

[xx]Donald R. Kelley, Francois Hotman: A Revolutionary Ordeal. Princeton, 1973. pg. 110.

[xxi]Ibid., pg. 111

[xxii]John Calvin, Commentaries on Daniel, Grand Rapids, MI. pg. 382

[xxiii] Greaves, pg. 129.

[xxiv]N.M. Sutherland, “Calvinism and the Conspiracy of Amboise.” History, June 1962, pg. 137.

[xxv] Greaves. pp. 114-125.

[xxvi] Ibid., pg. 127

[xxvii] Ibid., pp. 126-141

[xxviii] A.S.P. Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty. Chicago, 1937. pg. 203.

[xxix] Francis Schaeffer, A Christian Manifesto, Westchester, IL. 1981, pp. 103-104.

[xxx] John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. New York. 1960. pp. 469.

[xxxi] Roger Shinn, “Liberation, Reconciliation, and Just Revolution.” Ecumenical Review, Oct. 1978. pg. 324.

[xxxii] Eberhard Bethge, Bonhoeffer: Exile and Martyr. New York, 1975. pg. 134.

[xxxiii] Ibid., pg. 135.

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